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COMBATING THE ILLICIT INTERNET: DECISIONS BY THE
TENTH CIRCUIT TO APPLY HARSHER SENTENCES AND
LESSENED SEARCH REQUIREMENTS TO CHILD
PORNOGRAPHERS USING COMPUTERS
There is no adequate way to measure the damage caused by those
who produce and sell child pornography. Child pornographers rob
children of their innocence and leave them harmed for life. Society
must not tolerate this behavior, and the federal government must
have the resolve and the necessary tools to combat it.
... In light of these significant harms, it is essential that those who
are caught and convicted for this conduct be punished severely.'
With its inexpensive, unlimited and instantaneous transmission
characteristics, the Internet has been termed "the most efficient pornog-
raphy distribution engine ever conceived., 2 About one-fifth of worldwide
Internet users regularly visit a commercial pornography site,3 making the
Internet the "primary medium for pornography transmission." Estimates
of the annual U.S. sales revenue from child pornography approach one
billion dollars.5
In 1994, about twenty-three percent of federal child pornography
cases involved the use of a computer.6 In 1995, that number increased by
more than one-fifth, to twenty-eight percent . In response to such growth,
Congress enacted legislation to stiffen the penalties assessed against
child pornographers.8 The legislation subjects suspected child pornogra-
phers to lessened search and seizure requirements and subjects convicted
pornographers to increased sentencing terms. 9 If crimes were committed
by using the computer, the pornographers may have restrictions on Inter-
net use that reach into their parole terms.'0 The lessened search and sei-
1. H.R. REP. No. 104-90, at 3-4 (1995), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 759, 760-61.
2. Lesli C. Esposito, Note, Regulating the Internet: The New Battle Against Child
Pornography, 30 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 541, 541 (1998) (quoting Bill Frezza, Morality and
Imagination: Technology Challenges Both, COMM. WK., Jan. 13, 1997, at 31, 1997 WL 7691238).
3. See Kelly M. Doherty, Comment, www.obscenity.com: An Analysis of Obscenity and
Indecency Regulation on the Internet, 32 AKRON L. REV. 259, 263 (1999).
4. Esposito, supra note 2, at 541.
5. See HOWARD A. DAVIDSON & GREGORY A. LOKEN, U.S. DEP'T. OF JUSTICE, CHILD
PORNOGRAPHY AND PROSTITUTION 1 (1987).
6. See U. S. SENTENCING COMM'N, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: SEX OFFENSES AGAINST
CHILDREN, at 30 (1996), http://www.ussc.gov/r-congress/scac.htm (last visited Feb. 18, 2002).
7. See id.
8. See H.R. REP. No. 104-90, at 3-4 (1995), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 759, 760-61.
9. See id
10. See discussion infra Parts I.B. & II.B.
379
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
zure standard applies whether authorities discover pornography, or even
merely believe it may exist, on the defendant's computer."
During this past year, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
expanded the definition of "solicitation" of a minor, 2 supported offense-
level enhancements for child pornographers who use computers to com-
mit crimes,'3 upheld Internet restrictions on paroled child pornography
defendants,' and widened the scope of warranted searches to encompass
all material on computer hard drives and disks.'5 The change in the
court's traditional interpretation is in response to the realization that
computers present extraordinarily wide distribution capabilities and, by
exploiting a child's fascination with computers, may be effective in en-
ticing minors to engage in pornographic activity.
16
As presented in several cases that came before the Tenth Circuit in
2000-2001, this survey examines the current movement toward reinter-
preting traditional search and seizure requirements, and increasing pen-
alties for defendants convicted of child pornography crimes involving
computer usage. Part I examines the legislation behind the increased
sentencing and parole penalties, and the Court of Appeals' corresponding
interpretation of that legislation. Part H continues that analysis, focusing
on the lowered standards applied to both the execution of search war-
rants, and the search and seizure of computer equipment.
I. PENALTIES INCREASE WHEN A COMPUTER IS USED IN THE
SOLICITATION OF MINORS
A. Legislation that Controls the Crime of Child Pornography
The federal crimes constituting sex offenses against children fall
into three major categories: pornography, transportation, and criminal
sexual abuse. 7 This paper focuses on the first category.
Sex offenses against children constitute a small percentage of the
total federal criminal sentencings.'8 In 1995, courts sentenced only fifty-
eight defendants for committing child pornography crimes, constituting
0.2% of all federal sentencings.' 9 That same year, the total number of
federal convictions for violations of all child sex crime laws numbered
11. See discussion infra Part fl.C.l.a.2.
12. See discussion infra Part I.C.
13. See discussion infra Part I.C.I.a.
14. See discussion infra Part I.D.
15. See discussion infra Part ll.B. .a.3.
16. See, e.g., United States v. Reaves, 253 F.3d 1201, 1204-05 (10th Cir. 2001) (construing
H.R. REP. No. 104-90, at 3-4 (1995), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 759, 760-61).
17. See U. S. SENTENCING COMM'N, supra note 6, 
at 1.
18. See id. at 2.
19. See id.
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209, approximately 0.6% of all federal convictions.' However, federal
prosecutions account for only a small number of child pornography de-
fendants.2' In cases involving the rape of a minor, which is one category
from which accurate state and federal numbers may be drawn, state
courts convicted an estimated 8,662 offenders in 1992.22 Using this esti-
mated figure, federal convictions constituted only 1.6% of the total na-
tionwide convictions for rape of a minor.23 These numbers suggest that
child sex offenders commit a staggering number of crimes in the United
States each year.
Federal law criminalizes the production of child pornography under
18 U.S.C. §§ 2251 and 2252.24 Section 2251 provides:
Any person who employs, uses, persuades, induces, entices, or co-
erces any minor to engage in . . any sexually explicit conduct for the
purpose of producing any visual depiction of such conduct, shall be
punished ... if such person knows or has reason to know that such
visual depiction will be transported in interstate or foreign commerce
or mailed, if that visual depiction was produced using materials that
have been mailed, shipped, or transported in interstate or foreign
commerce by any means, including by computer, or if such visual de-
piction has actually been transported in interstate or foreign com-
merce or mailed.25
In the United States, pornography is "more freely available over the
Internet than in other mass communications media., 26 The increasing use
of the Internet to purchase, trade, and download pornographic materials
subjects many child pornographers to the interstate transport clause of §
2251 .2 Courts may impose sentences ranging from ten years to life im-
prisonment for violations of § 2251.28
In addition to restricting production, federal law also prohibits the
interstate transport, receipt, reproduction, and sale of child
pornography.29 Similar to § 225 1's provision, § 2252A explicitly provides
20. See id. (citing fifty-eight sentences for child pornography, six sentences for transportation
of a minor, and 145 sentences for criminal sexual abuse).
21. See id.
22. See id.
23. See U. S. SENTENCING COMM'N, supra note 6, at 2.
24. See id. at 1.
25. 18 U.S.C. § 225 1(a) (2000) (emphasis added).
26. Anthony L. Clapes, The Wages of Sin: Pornography and Internet Providers, COMPUTER
LAW, July 1996, at 1.
27. See Esposito, supra note 2, at 541 ("the Internet has caused a surge in the production and
distribution of child pornography"); Clapes, supra note 26, at I ("pornography is not rampant on the
Internet; it is, however, more freely available over the Internet than in other mass communications
media in the United States").
28. See 18 U.S.C. § 225 1(d).
29. See 18 U.S.C. § 2252A (2000).
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that interstate transport includes transmission via computer.3" A violation
of § 2252A carries a penalty of up to thirty years of imprisonment.3
In 1984, Congress created the United States Sentencing Commis-
sion (hereinafter "Sentencing Commission") to develop and maintain
uniform sentencing guidelines for use by federal judges. The guidelines
established base offense levels for each federal crime.33 As part of the
guidelines, the Sentencing Commission also established sentence-level
enhancements, which increase the offense level of the crime committed.
M
Balancing such enhancements against any applicable credits results in a
"total 'offense level' number" that "corresponds to a sentencing table
which, together with considerations of prior criminal history, sets forth
the appropriate sentencing range (in months) that the judge must employ
when sentencing an offender."3 Each year, the Sentencing Commission
proposes revisions to its published guidelines, which enter into effect
unless Congress acts to modify or block them.36
A defendant's use of a computer to produce or solicit child pornog-
raphy subjects the defendant to sentence enhancement under the U. S.
Sentencing Guidelines Manual (hereinafter "Sentencing Guidelines").
37
Similarly, sentence enhancements also apply when the defendant used a
computer to transmit child pornography.38
B. Pornography's "Significant Harms" Caused Congress to Callfor
Increased Sentence Terms
Federal legislation protecting children from sexual exploitation has
existed at least since 1977, when Congress enacted the Protection of
Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act of 1977.' 9 That law made it
illegal to engage a minor in any sexually explicit conduct for the purpose
of producing a visual depiction of that conduct, when such depiction
would be transported via interstate commerce.' Since the 1977 act re-sulted in only a single conviction, Congress modified the law by passing
30. See 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(1).
31. See 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(b).





37. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2G2.1(b)(3)(B) (2001).
38. See id. at § 2G2.2(b)(5).
39. Pub. L. No. 95-225, 92 Stat. 7 (1977) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251-53
(2000)). See Anthony Miranda, A Survey of Federal Cases Involving the Child Pornography
Prevention Act of 1996, 9 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 483, 484 (2000).
40. See Miranda, supra note 39, at 484.
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the Child Protection Act of 1984,' itself amended by the Child Sexual
Abuse and Pornography Act of 1986.2
Congress continued to refine the law by passing the Child Protec-
tion and Obscenity Enforcement Act of 1988, ' 3 which criminalized using
a computer "to transport, distribute, or receive child pornography."
Later reforms included the Child Protection Restoration and Penalties
Enhancement Act of 19904' and the Sex Crimes Against Children Pre-
vention Act of 1995," discussed below. Congress next passed the Child
Pornography Prevention Act of 1996,47 which was a turning point be-
cause the act regulated content rather than conduct48 by criminalizing
"visual depictions [made by computer] that create the impression that
children are involved in sexually explicit acts. ''49 Congress recently re-
formed the law by passing the Protection of Children from Sexual
Predators Act of 1998.50
In the Sex Crimes Against Children Prevention Act of 1995, Con-
gress increased the penalties for certain sex crimes against children that
involved the use of a computer.5 These changes found their genus in the
Family Reinforcement Act, which addressed crimes against children, and
Congress' perceived need to control child pornography.52 Perceiving
"significant harms" 53 arising at the nexus between computer use and child
pornography, the House of Representatives passed H.R. 1240.-4 In the
words of the House Committee on the Judiciary:
Distributing child pornography through computers is particularly
harmful because it can reach an almost limitless audience. Because of
its wide dissemination and instantaneous transmission, computer-
assisted trafficking is also more difficult for law enforcement officials
to investigate and prosecute. Additionally, the increasing use of com-
41. Pub. L. No. 98-292, 98 Stat. 204 (1984) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251-53).
42. Pub. L. No. 99-628 § 2, 100 Stat. 3510 (1986) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2251).
See Miranda, supra note 39, at 484.
43. Pub. L. No. 100-690 § 7511, 102 Stat. 4181 (1988) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§
2251A-2252).
44. Miranda, supra note 39, at 484.
45. Pub. L. No. 101-647 § 301, 104 Stat. 4789 (1990) (codified as amended in scattered titles
of the U.S.C.).
46. Pub. L. No. 104-71, 109 Stat. 774 (1995) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2423
(1995); 28 U.S.C. § 994 (1995)).
47. Pub. L. No. 104-208 § 121, 110 Stat. 3009 (1997) (codified as amended in scattered titles
of the U.S.C.).
48. See Dawn A. Edick, Note, Regulation of Pornography on the Internet in the United States
and the United Kingdom: A Comparative Analysis, 21 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 437,445 (1998).
49. Miranda, supra note 39, at 485.
50. Pub. L. No. 105-314, 112 Stat. 2974 (1998) (codified as amended in scattered titles of the
U.S.C.).
51. See Pub. L. No. 104-71, 109 Stat. 774.
52. See H.R. REP. No. 104-90, at 3-4 (1995), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 759, 760-61.
53. Id. at 4.
54. See Pub. L. No. 104-71, 109 Stat. 774.
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puters to transmit child pornography substantially increases the like-
lihood that this material will be viewed by, and thus harm, children.
Finally, the Committee notes with particular concern the fact that pe-
dophiles may use a child's fascination with computer technology as a
lure to drag children into sexual relationships.55
Essentially, the House Committee not only feared that pornogra-
phers would entice children to engage in pornographic acts by merely
enabling children to view images, but also that computer usage might
increase the overall number of images disseminated due to the ease with
which pornographers can copy and transmit material to a virtually un-
limited market. In the Sentencing Commission's words: "Persons who
transmit the images... may be mailing a single photo to a friend, or they
may be more similar to a person who opens an adult bookstore in every
city in the world. 56 However, § 2G2.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines
"does not distinguish between persons who e-mail images to a single
voluntary recipient and those who establish a BBS [bulletin board sys-
tem] and distribute child pornography to large numbers of subscribers."57
Finding great potential for significant harm to children, the House
concluded "it is essential that those who are caught and convicted for this
conduct be punished severely." 58 Thus, H.R. 1240 directed the Sentenc-
ing Commission to "increase the base offense level by at least 2 levels
for an offense committed under section 2251(c)(1)(A) and 2252(a) of
title 18, United States Code, if a computer was used to transmit the no-
tice or advertisement to the intended recipient or to transport or ship the
visual depiction. 59
The Sentencing Commission complied, and on April 30, 1996,
submitted to Congress the guidelines that increased those sentences. 6°
Increasing the offense level directly resulted in an increase to the sen-
tencing term: in the case of a child pornography producer, the sentence
increases from the original range of fifty-seven to seventy-one months, to
seventy to eighty-seven months per count; in the case of a child pornog-
raphy trafficker, the range increases from the original range of eighteen
to twenty-four months, to twenty-four to thirty months per count.6 ' By
55. H.R. REP. No. 104-90, at 3-4.
56. U. S. SENTENCING COMM'N, supra note 6, at 29.
57. Id. at 30.
58. H.R. REP. No. 104-90, at 4.
59. Sex Crimes Against Children Prevention Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-71 § 53, 109 Stat.
774.
60. See U. S. SENTENCING COMM'N, supra note 6, at i. H.R. 1240 ordered the Sentencing
Commission to complete this report within 180 days of the enactment of the Sexual Crimes Against
Children Prevention Act of 1995. See H.R. REP. No. 104-90, at 2.
61. See U. S. SENTENCING COMM'N, supra note 6, at 4 tbl. 1.
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simply using a computer to commit a child pornography offense, a per-
son increases his or her sentence by roughly twenty-five percent.62
C. The Expanded Definition of "Solicit"
Taking the House Committee on the Judiciary's concerns as a man-
date, the Sentencing Guidelines provide offense-level enhancement if a
computer is used to solicit participation by a minor in sexually explicit
conduct.63 In United States v. Reaves,64 the Tenth Circuit confronted an
issue of first impression: what is the definition of the term "solicit? 65
Interpreting the House Committee on the Judiciary's "broad concerns,"
the Court expanded the meaning of solicitation of a minor to include any
situation in which a computer is used, whether or not that use is directly
related to a common notion of "solicitation. ' 66
1. Tenth Circuit Cases
a. United States v. Reaves67
i. Facts
In Reaves, the defendant acquired several child pornography images
from the Internet.68 Using his computer, the defendant showed those im-
ages to children to entice and lure them into sexual relationships, and to
produce sexually explicit materials.69 The defendant pled guilty to five
counts of producing child pornography, and "one count each of interstate
transportation, distribution, and possession, of child pornography."
70
Reasoning that "the computer played an integral part in a solicita-
tion scheme presumably designed to accustom the minors to child por-
nography and encourage the sexual conduct depicted therein," the United
States District Court for the District of Wyoming determined that the
defendant's actions constituted solicitation, which thus subjected him to
the offense-level enhancer § 2G2.1(b)(3). 7' Following those guidelines,
the district court increased the defendant's offense level by two.72 The
defendant appealed, arguing that because he did not directly ask or re-
62. See id. at ii.
63. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2G2. I(b)(3)(B) (2001).
64. 253 F.3d 1201 (10th Cir. 2001).
65. See Reaves, 253 F.3d at 1202.
66. Id. at 1205; see also discussion infra Part I.C.2.a.2.
67. 253 F.3d 1201 (10th Cir. 2001).
68. See Reaves, 253 F.3d at 1203.
69. See id.
70. Id. at 1202. The defendant's production of pornography violated 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a). See
id. The defendant's "interstate transportation, distribution, and possession, of child pornography"
violated "18 U.S.C. §§ 2252A(a)(1) and (b)(1), (a)(2)(B) and (b)(1), and (a)(5)(B) and (b)(2),
respectively." Id.
71. Reaves, 253 F.3d at 1203.
72. See id. at 1202-03.
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quest children to participate in creating the pornography, he did not "so-
licit" minors via his computer, and therefore the offense-level enhance-
ment did not apply.73
ii. Decision
Noting that § 2G2.1 provides no definition of "solicit," the Tenth
Circuit struggled to determine whether the phrase "if a computer was
used to solicit participation" meant "if a computer was used to directly
request participation," or "if a computer was used to lure or entice par-
ticipation. 74 In order to determine the intent of the Sentencing Commis-
sion, the Tenth Circuit turned to the congressional mandate underlying
the Sentencing Commission's change to the guidelines.75
After considering the House Commission on the Judiciary's state-
ments outlining the reason for the offense-level enhancing statute, the
Court noted that "[1]imiting 'solicit' ... to 'direct requests' ... solely
penalizes how a pedophile exploits a child's fascination with computers
rather than if a pedophile does so-an unacceptable result given Con-
gress's broad concerns. 76 The court concluded that "solicit" was not
narrowly limited to situations where a defendant used a computer to di-
rectly contact a victim; rather it applied in a more general sense, to situa-
tions where a defendant used a computer at all.77 The Tenth Circuit thus
upheld the offense-level enhancement.8
2. Other Circuits
a. United States v. Brown
79
Brown represents the only other appellate opinion to address the
solicitation definition issue presented in Reaves. Brown extended the
scope of solicitation to include the defendant's use of a computer as a
desensitizing tool, which enabled him to obtain minors' cooperation in
the creation of pornography.8 °
i. Facts
73. See id. at 1203.
74. Id. at 1204-05. The court applied the version of the offense-level enhancing statute in
force at the time of defendant's commission of the crime, which provided for an increased sentence
"[ilf a computer was used to solicit participation by or with a minor in sexually explicit conduct for
the purpose of producing sexually explicit material." Id. at 1202 (quoting U.S. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2G2.1 (b)(3) (1998)).
75. See Reaves, 253 F.3d at 1204-05.
76. Id.
77. See id. at 1205.
78. See id.
79. 237 F.3d 625 (6th Cir. 2001).
80. See Brown, 237 F.3d at 629.
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As part of a worldwide child pornography investigation, the United
States Customs Service learned that Internet Relay Chat (hereinafter
"IRC") software was being used to exchange child pornography images.8'
During the course of the investigation, British authorities seized a com-
puter belonging to a member of a private IRC group, which used the
computer to exchange child pornography.82 The seized computer revealed
several IRC nicknames, including one that U.S. law enforcement offi-
cials ultimately tied to the defendant, who officials subsequently ar-
rested 3
The defendant pled guilty to three counts of "producing child por-
nography for transportation in interstate commerce" and one count of
"possessing child pornography using materials shipped via interstate
commerce," among other charges The United States District Court for
the Western District of Michigan determined the defendant "allowed his
victims unmonitored access to the computer wherein they observed that
other children were being filmed and sexually abused by adults." 85 Find-
ing the defendant thus used his computer to solicit the children's partici-
pation in the production of pornography, the district court applied §
2G2.1(b)(3) and sentenced the defendant to a 405-month term of impris-
onment.86
ii. Decision
On appeal, the defendant argued that § 2G2.1(b)(3)'s sentence en-
hancement did not apply because he did not use a computer to solicit
minors' participation in the creation of pornography. 87 The defendant
interpreted "solicit" to require that he "specifically ask minors [via his
computer] to engage in sexually-explicit conduct."88 The Sixth Circuit
disagreed, determining that Congress did not intend such a narrow defi-
nition of the term "solicit. 8 9 In a short analysis, the Court held that al-
lowing children to view child pornography gave them the "impression
that this is acceptable conduct," which aided in the defendant's ability to
use those children to produce child pornography. 9° The Sixth Circuit con-
81. See id. at 626-27. IRC allows users to communicate without using their real names. See
ORIN S. KERR, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SEARCHING AND SEIZING COMPUTERS AND OBTAINING
ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS 91 (2001), http://www.usdoj.gov/
criminal/cybercrime/searchmanual.pdf (Feb. 16, 2001).
82. See Brown, 237 F.3d at 627.
83. See id.
84. Id. at 626. The defendant's production of child pornography violated 18 U.S.C. § 2251 (a).
See Brown, 237 F.3d at 626. The defendant's possession of child pornography violated 18 U.S.C. §
2252(a)(4)(B). See Brown, 237 F.3d at 626.
85. Brown, 237 F.3d at 628.
86. See id. at 626.
87. See id. at 628.
88. Id.
89. See id. at 628-29 (construing H.R. REP. No. 104-90, at 3-4 (1995), reprinted in 1996
U.S.C.C.A.N. 759, 760-61).
90. See id. at 629.
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cluded that because the defendant used his computer "to desensitize his
victims to deviant sexual activity, he was using it to solicit participation"
in the creation of child pornography.9
3. Analysis
As the Tenth Circuit noted, § 2G2. 1 (b)(3) provides no express defi-
nition of the term "solicit., 92 In both of the above cases, the appellate
courts deduced the meaning of the term by using the House Committee
on the Judiciary's statements regarding the dangers of computer usage in
association with child pornography.93 Both the Tenth Circuit and the
Sixth Circuit interpreted the broad concerns outlined by the House
Committee on the Judiciary as requiring a defendant's mere use of a
computer in connection with child pornography to suffice as
solicitation." The common notion of solicitation cannot be strictly ap-
plied because, as Congress recognized, the dangers found at the nexus
between computers and child pornography are very high-so high that
there may be no way to adequately measure the damages.
95
The Tenth Circuit's expansive interpretation of the term "solicit"
comports with the only other appellate opinion on this issue. It remains
to be seen whether this expansive view will become the court's standard
interpretation.
D. A Defendant's Use of a Computer May Prompt the Court to Institute
Post-Sentence Parole Requirements
Child pornography, coupled with computer use, may result in pen-
alty increases that reach beyond sentencing. In some circumstances, this
coupling can affect a defendant's parole term when a court mandates
compliance with special conditions. In the cases below, the Tenth Circuit
permitted parole-phase Internet restrictions on convicted child pornogra-
phers, provided courts narrowly construe such restrictions.
1. Tenth Circuit Cases
a. United States v. White96
i. Facts
Responding to an Internet advertisement posted as part of a United
States Customs Service sting operation, the defendant ordered three
91. Brown, 237 F.3d at 629.
92. See United States v. Reaves, 253 F.3d 1201, 1204 (10th Cir. 2001).
93. See Brown, 237 F.3d at 628-29; Reaves, 253 F.3d at 1204-05.
94. See Brown, 237 F.3d at 629; Reaves, 253 F.3d at 1205.
95. See H.R. REP. No. 104-90, at 3-4 (1995), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 759, 760-61.
96. 244 F.3d 1199 (10th Cir. 2001).
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videotapes advertised as containing child pornography.9 7 United States
Customs officers made a controlled delivery, which triggered the defen-
dant's arrest.98 A federal grand jury indicted the defendant for violating a
federal statute that prohibits a person from receiving child pornography,
among other charges.' The defendant pled guilty and served a two-year
sentence.1°°
One week after serving out his sentence, the defendant violated a
requirement of his supervised release by consuming alcohol.'' After a
second such violation, the government then filed a petition to revoke the
defendant's supervised release. 0 2 In a subsequent hearing, the United
States District Court for the District of New Mexico sentenced the de-
fendant to six months incarceration followed by a two-year period of
supervised release.' 3 The court imposed five special conditions upon the
supervised release.' ° One of these conditions prevented the defendant
from possessing sexually explicit material and any computer with access
to the Internet.' 5 The defendant challenged this special condition by ar-
guing that a "plea to a single count of receiving child pornography which
he ordered over the Internet ... is not 'reasonably related' to prohibiting
him from all access to the Internet."' ° The defendant further argued that
this "special condition [wa]s 'greater than necessary' in the equation
balancing protection of the public with the goals of sentencing."'
0 7
ii. Decision
The Tenth Circuit held that while a federal statute'0 8 permitted the
district court to exercise discretion in imposing a term of supervised re-
lease, the district court is limited by the requirement that it "shall impose
a sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary."' 9 The court held
that the special condition preventing the defendant from owning a com-
puter with Internet access potentially is both too narrow and overbroad." °
The court found the condition potentially too narrow because the terms
97. See White, 244 F.3d at 1201.
98. See id.
99. See id. (noting the grand jury indicted the defendant for violating 18 U.S.C. §




103. See White, 244 F.3d at 1201.
104. See id.
105. See id. The provision in question provided that the defendant "shall not possess erotica, or
any other sexually explicit material, and shall not possess a computer with Intemet access
throughout his period of supervised release." Id.
106. White, 244 F.3d at 1201-02, 1205.
107. Id.
108. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(a) (2001).
109. White, 244 F.3d at 1204 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)).
110. See id. at 1206. The relevant portion of the condition provided that the defendant "shall
not possess a computer with Internet access throughout his period of supervised release." Id
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of the condition were too indeterminate and, thus, the condition did not
bar the defendant from accessing to the Internet, but simply from owning
a computer with such access."' The court found the condition potentially
too broad because the district court could have intended for the word
"possess" to restrict all of the defendant's Internet and computer usage,
even usage unrelated to the defendant's underlying crime."2 From that
viewpoint, the sentence was "greater than necessary."' 
3
The Tenth Circuit determined that instead, the district court should
have limited the condition to use of the Internet, as opposed to posses-
sion of a computer with an Internet connection, as many alternative
means existed by which the defendant could have accessed the Internet
without owning a computer. ' 4 The court thus found the restriction "nei-
ther reasoned nor reasonable" and remanded the case for clarification on
the condition prohibiting the defendant from owning a computer with
Internet access.'5
Although restrictive, the Tenth Circuit's decision is not as strict as
the Third Circuit's decision in United States v. Crandon,'6 below, where
the Third Circuit supported the total ban on a defendant's possession of,
procurement of, purchase of, or other access to any form of computer
network, including networks operating outside the Internet."'
2. Other Circuits
a. United States v. Crandon' 1
8
i. Facts
The defendant solicited a minor via e-mail, then traveled to her lo-
cation and "engaged in sexual relations with her."" 9 The defendant took
forty-eight photographs of the minor.' 20 Two of the photographs por-
trayed sexually explicit activity, including one photograph of the defen-
dant and the minor participating in oral sex. 2 ' The defendant mailed the
film to a Seattle film developer and received the developed pictures by
Ill. Seeid. at 1205.
112. See id. at 1206.
113. See id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)).
114. See id. at 1206-07.
115. White, 244 F.3d at 1207 (holding that "any condition limiting [the defendant's] use of a
computer or access to the Internet must reflect these realities and permit reasonable monitoring by a
probation officer. The purpose of the special condition must be articulated and enforceable as
defined. As presently written, the special condition is neither reasoned nor reasonable.").
116. 173 F.3d 122 (3d Cir. 1999).
117. See Crandon, 173 F.3d at 125.
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return mail.' 2 After his return to New Jersey, the defendant continued to
contact the minor.'23 The defendant again traveled to the minor's loca-
tion, and this time he picked her up and began to return home.'24 Soon
after their departure from the minor's home, the defendant discovered the
police were looking for him. 25 The defendant sent the minor home on a
bus and then returned to his home state. 2 6 The police later arrested the
defendant and seized his cache of pornographic photographs.'
27
The defendant pled guilty to receiving child pornography in viola-
tion of a federal statute.'28 The United States District Court for the Dis-
trict of New Jersey sentenced the defendant to seventy-eight months of
imprisonment and three years of supervised release.' 29 The terms of the
defendant's parole "included a special condition directing that [the de-
fendant] not 'possess, procure, purchase or otherwise obtain access to
any form of computer network, bulletin board, Internet, or exchange
format involving computers unless specifically approved by the United
States Probation Office. ' ,"130 The defendant appealed on the basis that the
special condition "unnecessarily infringe[d] upon his liberty interests and
b[ore] no logical relation to his offense."
131
ii. Decision
The Third Circuit held that because the defendant "used the Internet
as a means to develop an illegal sexual relationship with a young girl
over a period of several months[,] . .. the condition of release limiting
[the defendant's] Internet access is related to the dual aims of deterring
him from recidivism and protecting the public.' 32 As such, the Third
Circuit upheld the restriction on Internet use as a reasonable limitation,








128. See id. (noting the defendant pled guilty to violating 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2)).
129. See id.
130. Crandon, 173 F.3d at 125.
131. Id. at 127.
132. Id. at 127-28.
133. Id. at 127. See generally 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d). The court read 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d) to hold
that
a District Court may order any appropriate condition to the extent it:
(1) is reasonably related to certain factors, including (a) the nature and circumstances
of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant, (b) deterring
further criminal conduct by the defendant, or (c) protecting the public from further
criminal conduct by the defendant; [and] (2) involves no greater deprivation of liberty
than is reasonably necessary for the purposes of deterrence and protection of the
public.
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The court further held that even though this special restriction "may
hamper his employment opportunities upon release," and infringe upon
the defendant's First Amendment rights, "the restrictions ... are permis-
sible because the special condition is narrowly tailored and is directly
related to deterring [the defendant] and protecting the public."' '
3. Analysis
The Tenth Circuit strictly adhered to Congress's expressed intent.
Not only will a defendant be subjected to an increased term of incarcera-
tion, but when that defendant returns to society upon rehabilitation, his
parole restrictions may legally include restrictions upon Internet use.135
The Third Circuit took that notion farther, expressly comparing the rela-
tive harm to a defendant's constitutional rights with the risk of public
harm, and determined that a total ban on Internet use is permissible, pro-
vided that the restriction remains narrowly construed towards averting
that harm.1
36
After determining that Internet restrictions are proper, the Tenth
Circuit discussed the technical means by which effective control of
Internet use could occur.'37 One method is to install a database-centered
software program specifically designed to restrict access to pornographic
sites.'38 The mayor of Boston, Massachusetts, Thomas Menino, required
the Boston Public Library to install such software "on every computer
accessible to children.' ' 39 The program, CyberPatrol, prevents access to
web sites listed in its database of objectionable web sites.'40 An alterna-
tive means of preventing access to pornographic web sites is to employ a
program that scans the target site for objectionable words and blocks web
sites containing these objectionable words.
41
While useful, neither restriction method is perfect: in the case of a
database restriction method, someone must continually update the data-
base to afford protection from an expanding number of Internet sites.
4 2
In the case of objectionable word scanning, such software may restrict
access in an overbroad fashion.1 3 For example, such a program might
Crandon, 173 F.3d at 127 (alteration in original).
134. See Crandon, 173 F.3d at 128.
135. See United States v. White, 244 F.3d 1199, 1207 (10th Cir. 2001).
136. See Crandon, 173 F.3d at 127.
137. See White, 244 F.3d at 1206 (noting the availability of filtering software capable of
monitoring the defendant's Internet usage).
138. See id.
139. Edick, supra note 48, at 449.
140. See id.
141. See id.
142. See White, 244 F.3d at 1206.
143. See Edick, supra note 48, at 449-50.
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restrict access to "medical and educational information on 'breast' cancer
and 'Middlesex, England.
'M
II. LESSENED SEARCH AND SEIZURE REQUIREMENTS APPLY WHEN
COMPUTERS ARE INVOLVED IN CHILD PORNOGRAPHY INVESTIGATIONS
While the previous section focused on the penalties applicable to a
defendant who used a computer when committing a child pornography
crime, this section analyzes the pre-trial effects upon search and seizure
requirements when the defendant's commission of the crime involved a
computer. As above, the defendant's use of a computer changes the way
courts view and treat such a defendant.
A. Background
The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution provides for freedom
from unreasonable search and seizure.145 The United States Supreme
Court has held that the Fourth Amendment's protections are only avail-
able upon the showing of a reasonable expectation of privacy. '46 The
"reasonable expectation" determination requires both that a defendant
have "an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy, and, second, that the
expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as
'reasonable.'"
4 7
Before officers may conduct a search, they must establish probable
cause and must ensure the search warrant describes with particularity the
property to be seized.'4 Probable cause is established when "given the
totality of the circumstances, 'there is a fair probability that contraband
or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place." 4 9 On the
issue of particularity, the Tenth Circuit has held that "[t]he Fourth
Amendment requires that a search warrant describe the things to be
seized with sufficient particularity to prevent a general exploratory rum-
maging in a person's belongings."'" The reason for the particularity re-
quirement is to leave the officer serving the warrant no discretion,
144. Id. at 450.
145. The Fourth Amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U. S. CONST. amend. IV.
146. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967), accord Minnesota v. Olson, 495
U.S. 91, 95-96 (1990).
147. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
148. See U. S. CONST. amend. IV.
149. United States v. Simpson, 152 F.3d 1241, 1246 (10th Cir. 1998) (quoting Illinois v. Gates,
462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983)).
150. United States v. Carey, 172 F.3d 1268, 1272 (10th Cir. 1999).
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thereby preventing general searches.'-' A warrant's description qualifies
as sufficiently particular if it "enables the searcher to reasonably ascer-
tain and identify the things authorized to be seized.' 52
When computers are involved, several issues complicate the par-
ticularity requirement: the ability of a computer to store large quantities
of data, the computer's ability to hide data,'53 and the fact that a file's title
need bear no relation to that file's content.5 4 These issues may require
law enforcement officials to seize a computer and remove it from a loca-
tion in order to search the computer's contents.
5
According to the U.S. Department of Justice, two potential seizure
options exist, and the option selected by law enforcement officials de-
pends upon the role of the computer in the underlying crime:
If the hardware is itself evidence, an instrumentality, contraband, or a
fruit of crime, agents will usually plan to seize the hardware and
search its contents off-site. If the hardware is merely a storage device
for evidence, agents generally will only seize the hardware if less dis-
ruptive alternatives are not feasible.
56
When a defendant uses a computer in the transmission of child pornog-
raphy, the government considers the computer an instrumentality of the
crime. 7 As such, seizure of the entire computer is the usual practice.'58
Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure comports with this
assessment. 9 In a case where seizure of the computer itself becomes
151. See Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 196 (1927) ("The requirement that warrants
shall particularly describe the things to be seized makes general searches under them impossible, and
prevents the seizure of one thing under a warrant describing another. As to what is to be taken,
nothing is left to the discretion of the officer executing the warrant.").
152. United States v. Wolfenbarger, 696 F.2d 750, 752 (10th Cir. 1982).
153. According to the U.S. Department of Justice:
[f]iles may be stored on a floppy diskette, on a hidden directory in a suspect's laptop, or
on a remote server located thousands of miles away. The files may be encrypted,
misleadingly tilted, stored in unusual file formats, or commingled with millions of
unrelated, innocuous, and even statutorily protected files.
KERR, supra note 80, at 29. See also Erickson v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 937 F.2d 1548, 1554
(10th Cir. 1991) (noting that drug trafficking activity is often concealed or masked by deceptive
records).
154. See Stephan K. Bayens, The Search and Seizure of Computers: Are We Sacrificing
Personal Privacy for the Advancement of Technology?, 48 DRAKE L. REV. 239, 263 (2000).
155. See KERR, supra note 81, at 31.
156. Id.
157. See id.; see also Davis v. Gracey, Ill F.3d 1472, 1480 (10th Cir. 1997) (holding that
computer equipment used to display and distribute pornographic images constitutes an
instrumentality of the crime).
158. See KERR, supra note 81, at 32. When the instrumentality is not a single computer, but
instead is a network, the impossibilities of seizure are obvious. In such a case, "agents will want to
take a more nuanced approach to obtain the evidence they need." Id.
159. The rule provides:
A warrant may be issued under this rule to search for and seize any (1) property that
constitutes evidence of the commission of a criminal offense; or (2) contraband, the fruits
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necessary, the Tenth Circuit requires both that the search warrant ade-
quately describe the hardware and that the hardware seized by law en-
forcement officials fits within the warrant's description."o
B. What Standard Applies to the Search and Seizure of Evidence Con-
tained In Computer Hard Drives?
1. Tenth Circuit Cases
a. United States v. Campos '
i. Facts
In Campos, a jury found the defendant violated a federal statute that
prohibits the transmission of child pornography in interstate commerce
when the defendant e-mailed pornographic images over the Internet.'
62
The recipient of the images notified the FBI and gave agents copies of
the e-mailed images. 63 FBI agents determined that the defendant sent the
images.' 6 The agents received a warrant enabling them to search the de-
fendant's home and computer for those images.'65 The FBI found and
seized the defendant's computer.' 66 In examining the computer's hard
drive, agents located the two pornographic images sent over the Internet,
plus six more pornographic images containing children. 67 At trial, the
defendant motioned to suppress the images.'" The United States District
Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma denied that motion.'6 9 Sub-
sequently, a jury convicted the defendant, and the court sentenced the
defendant to thirty-seven months of incarceration.
70
ii. Decision
On appeal, the defendant argued that the search was overbroad, as
agents "had grounds to search only for the two images that had been
sent."' 7'' The Tenth Circuit disagreed, finding the warrant within permis-
sible bounds because the warrant specified that it covered "items relating
of crime, or things otherwise criminally possessed; or (3) property designed or intended
for use or which is or has been used as the means of committing a criminal offense; or (4)
person for whose arrest there is probable cause, or who is unlawfully restrained.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 41 (b).
160. See Davis, 11 F.3d at 1478.
161. 221 F.3d 1143 (10th Cir. 2000).





166. See id. at 1145-46.
167. See id. at 1146.
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to child pornography.""' The court held that although the warrant per-
mitted agents to seize anything related to child pornography, the warrant
did not authorize "an unfocused inspection of all of [the defendant's]
property." 1
73
The court reiterated testimony given by an FBI agent during the
district court proceeding, in which the agent stated that due to the ability
to conceal evidence on a computer, "all the stored data [must be exam-
ined] to determine whether it is included in the warrant.' ' 174 The court
agreed with this assessment, distinguishing this situation from its deci-
sion in United States v. Carey, 75 below, by stating that "the officers here
did not expand the scope of their search in a manner not authorized by
the warrant.', 176 Rather, the search warrant in Campos specified the exact
type of material the agents found: child pornography.' 77 Thus, the court
upheld the agents' search of all files on the computer hard drive. 78
2. Analysis
The Tenth Circuit held that in order to determine which computer
files fall under the scope of the search warrant, FBI agents could exam-
ine all the data stored upon the computer's hard drive. 79 Interestingly, the
court noted that a computer search is constrained to information only on
that hardware and does not constitute the authorization of "an unfocused
inspection of all [the defendant's] property."'80
Despite the broad search allowed in Campos, the court's opinion did
note several restrictions on the scope of a computer search.'"' First, when
an investigator finds intermingled documents, those "containing both
relevant and irrelevant information," the investigator should seal those
documents and await approval of a magistrate before proceeding.' 82 Sec-
ond, the court pointed out that its holding does not permit an officer to
conduct a generalized search, where the discovery of the pornographic
images is collateral to the reason for the initial search.'83 In that case, it is
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. See Campos, 221 F.3d at 1146.
175. 172 F.3d 1268 (10th Cir. 1999).
176. Campos, 221 F.3d at 1148.
177. See id. at 1147.
178. See id.
179. See id.
180. Id. at 1148.
181. See id.
182. Campos, 221 F.3d at 1148.
183. See id.; see also discussion infra Part II.D.1.b. (discussing the court of appeals' approach
to an argument alleging a generalized search).
[Vol. 79:3
COMBATING THE ILLICIT INTERNET
improper for law enforcement officials to delve into every file on a de-
fendant's computer t8
C. What Constitutes a "Fair Probability" that the Search of a Residence
Will Uncover Material Evidence?
The search and seizure issues associated with finding the location of
a particular pornographic image are not limited to the search of computer
hard drives but extend to the search of residences. 8 ' Where the only indi-
cation of a file's origination is the Internet e-mail address of the sender,
does that provide probable cause that those images will be located at the
sender's home? The Tenth Circuit determined that it does provide prob-
able cause, holding in United States v. Cervini,8 6 below, that a simple e-
mail header provided officers with probable cause to search for porno-
graphic images within the sender's home.
87
1. Tenth Circuit Cases
a. United States v. Cervini'
8
i. Facts
In this case, the defendant posted on an Internet newsgroup web site
two pornographic pictures containing children.'89 The e-mail header from
the posting contained an Internet protocol address that allowed investi-
gators to subsequently link the photos to the defendant.' 90 The FBI ob-
tained a search warrant and executed a search at the defendant's resi-
dence.'9'
Authorities indicted the defendant for "knowingly transporting and
shipping child pornography in interstate commerce," in violation of fed-
eral statute.' 92 In addition, authorities also indicted the defendant for
"knowingly possessing an image of child pornography that was produced
using materials shipped and transported in interstate commerce," also in
violation of federal statute.
93
184. Compare Campos, 221 F.3d at 1147 (inadvertent discovery of items related to child
pornography during search for drug-related evidence), with United States v. Carey, 172 F.3d 1268,
1271 (10th Cir. 1999) (discovery of items related to child pornography pursuant to a warrant
permitting a search for such items).
185. See United States v. Cervini, 16 Fed.Appx. 865, 867 (10th Cir. 2001).
186. 16 Fed.Appx. at 865.
187. See id. at 866-67.
188. 16 Fed. Appx. 865 (10th Cir. 2001).
189. See id.
190. See id. at 867.
191. See id.
192. Id. (noting authorities indicted the defendant for violating 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(I)).
193. Id. (noting authorities indicted the defendant for violating 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B)).
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The defendant motioned to suppress all evidence obtained from the
search of his home.' 94 The defendant argued that "the affidavit in support
of the warrant provided insufficient probable cause that evidence of
criminal activity would be found at his residence."' 95 The United States
District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma denied the defen-
dant's motion. '96
ii. Decision
Upon review, the Tenth Circuit stated that a search warrant must
only "demonstrate a 'fair probability' that a search of [the] residence
would uncover evidence connecting [the defendant] to the pornographic
postings."'' 97 The court held that the e-mail header gave officers sufficient
probable cause, constituting a fair probability that officers would find
contraband or other criminal evidence at the sender's residence.' 98 Even if
other locations existed where such images could be found, the Tenth
Circuit found no requirement for the district court to "eliminate all other
possible conclusions which could be derived from the alleged facts"
when authorizing a search warrant.' 99 The court noted that "the totality of
the facts enable a reasonable person to draw the common-sense conclu-
sion that evidence of the crime would be found at [the defendant's] resi-
dence."2°°
Under United States v. Charbonneau,20' below, the United States
District Court for the Southern District of Ohio determined that even an
illegal search of a residence does not require suppression of seized evi-
dence because had a legal search occurred, officers would have inevita-
bly discovered the evidence.2 °2
2. Other Jurisdictions
a. United States v. Charbonneau"3
i. Facts
In Charbonneau, an FBI agent investigating child pornography on
the Internet posed as a pedophile and monitored two private America
OnLine chat rooms titled "Boys" and "Preteen. '2 ' Chat room members
194. See Cervini, 16 Fed.Appx. at 867.
195. Id.
196. See id.
197. Id. at 868 (quoting United States v. Simpson, 152 F.3d 1241, 1246 (10th Cir. 2000)).
198. See id.
199. Id.
200. Cervini, 16 Fed.Appx. at 868.
201. 979 F. Supp. 1177 (S.D. Ohio 1997).
202. See discussion infra Part lI.C.2.
203. 979 F. Supp. 1177 (S.D. Ohio 1997).
204. See Charbonneau, 979 F. Supp. at 1179.
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exchanged graphic child pornography image files. 0 The federal agent
recorded the typed conversations between chat room users.26 Chat room
users e-mailed the agent pornographic images of children." 7
The agent identified one sender, a chat room member, by his screen208
name. Using a search warrant, the FBI identified the defendant as the
209 210sender.' °9 Agents obtained a search warrant for the defendant's address.
The agents did not execute that search warrant. "' Instead, the agents en-
tered the residence after obtaining a signed consent form from the defen-
dant's wife.12 The agents seized two computers and several computer
disks that contained child pornography.23
ii. Decision
The defendant motioned to suppress both the chat room conversa-
tions and the physical evidence seized from his home as a result of those• 214
conversations. The defendant argued that both his freedom of speech
and reasonable expectation of privacy protected his chat room conversa-
tions.2" Finding the freedom of speech claim to be "[in]adequately sup-
ported by case law," the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Ohio dismissed that claim as meritless.1 6
As to the reasonable expectation of privacy claim, the court rea-
soned that, like a letter, an e-mail message is protected while in the proc-
ess of transmission. 217 However, once a recipient opens that e-mail, the
expectation of privacy dissipates.2 8 Making an interesting point, the court
stated, "a sender of e-mail runs the risk that he is sending the message to
an undercover agent.''2'9 Basing its decision on Hoffa v. United States,"
the district court determined that no expectation of privacy exists where
"a wrongdoer's misplaced belief that a person to whom he voluntarily
confides his wrongdoing will not reveal it."'22' In that case, the "letter" is
opened, and the recipient may reveal the contents to anyone. The court






210. See Charbonneau, 979 F. Supp. at 1179.
211. See id. at 1180.
212. See id.
213. See id.
214. See id. at 1183.
215. See id.




220. 385 U.S. 293 (1966).
221. Charbonneau, 979 F. Supp. at 1184-85 (quoting Hoffa, 385 U.S. at 302).
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stating that "messages sent to an addressee who later forwards the e-mail
to a third party do not enjoy the same reasonable expectations of privacy
once they have been forwarded., 22 The court applied this reasoning to
chat room transmissions, finding that "[m]essages sent to the public at
large in [a] 'chat room' ... lose any semblance of privacy. 223
On the question of illegal search and seizure, the court determined
that while the search of the defendant's home was illegal, the evidence
seized was admissible under the doctrine of inevitable discovery. 24 The
court determined that the agents had a valid search warrant, that absent
the permission to enter, the agents would have done so anyway, and that,
"the items seized would have been inevitably discovered through the
execution of the search warrant., 225 The court thus denied the defendant's
226motions to suppress the physical evidence and statements.
3. Analysis
While the Tenth Circuit has yet to rule on the issue of the expecta-
tion of privacy in e-mail communications, both the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Ohio and the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals have done so. The court in Charbonneau held that the Fourth
Amendment does not protect e-mail messages sent to an undercover fed-
eral agent: "an e-mail message, like a letter, cannot be afforded a reason-
able expectation of privacy once that message is received., 227 The Sixth
Circuit concurred with the latter assessment, holding that "the e-mailer
would be analogous to a letter-writer, whose 'expectation of privacy or-
dinarily terminates upon delivery' of the letter."22 Similarly, the Court of
Appeals for the Armed Forces has ruled that no expectation of privacy
229exists if a user forwards that original e-mail message to another person.
Although no expectation of privacy exists for a received e-mail
message, while an e-mail message is in transmission the sender does
have an expectation of privacy.23° The Court of Appeals for the Armed
Forces has held that "the transmitter of an e-mail message enjoys a rea-
222. Id. at 1185.
223. Id. (quoting United States v. Maxwell, 45 M.J. 406, 419 (C.A.A.F. 1996)).
224. See id. at 1187. The court found the search illegal because officers obtained the consent to
search through coercion. See id. at 1186. Among other coercive acts, the FBI agents told the
defendant's wife that if she did not consent to the search, the agents would break down the front
door to access their home. See id.
225. Id. at 1186-87.
226. See id. at 1187 (although the court granted one of the defendant's motions, the court
denied both motions discussed herein).
227. Charbonneau, 979 F. Supp. at 1184.
228. See Guest v. Leis, 255 F.3d 325, 333 (6th Cir. 2001) (quoting United States v. King, 55
F.3d 1193, 1196 (6th Cir. 1995)).
229. See United States v. Maxwell, 45 M.J. 406,419 (C.A.A.F. 1996).
230. See id. at 418.
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sonable expectation that police officials will not intercept the transmis-
sion."'
D. Seizure Rules When Police Discover Child Pornography While Exe-
cuting a Warrant Issued for Another Purpose
While the above cases dealt with probable cause issues surrounding
the search of a computer used in connection with child pornography
crimes, this section focuses on the seizure standard applied when child
pornography materials are discovered during a search authorized for
other purposes. Police only need to demonstrate a fair probability that
child pornography is located at a defendant's residence in order to re-
ceive a search warrant to search that home.32 In the cases below, the
Tenth Circuit extended the fair probability standard to include the situa-
tion where police view possible child pornography while conducting a
search for other items. 33
1. Tenth Circuit Cases
a. United States v. Wolfe
2 34
i. Facts
While executing a search warrant for counterfeiting evidence, which
resulted in the seizure of the defendant's computer and several disks,
Secret Service agents noticed three items of possible child pornography
in the defendant's residence.235 The agents chose not to seize those
items.36 After interviewing an accomplice, the agents, alerted to the pos-
sibility that the defendant was involved in child pornography, sought
another search warrant. 7
Once issued, that second search warrant permitted the agents to
search the defendant's computer hard drive and the previously seized
disks for evidence of child pornography. 21" The agents discovered an
"extensive" number of child pornography images.239 The government
charged the defendant with possession of child pornography.
240
At trial, the defendant asserted that the affidavit submitted in sup-
port of the second warrant was insufficient as a matter of law to establish
probable cause that the defendant possessed child pornography on his
231. Id.
232. See United States v. Rabe, 848 F.2d 994, 997 (9th Cir. 1988).
233. See discussion infra Part U.D.3.
234. No. 00-5045, 2000 WL 1862667 (10th Cir. Dec. 20, 2000).
235. See Wolfe, 2000 WL 1862667, at *1.
236. See id.
237. See id.
238. See id. at *2.
239. Id.
240. See id. (prosecutors charged the defendant with violating 18 U.S.C. § 2252 (2000)).
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computer, and thus the seized images were the result of an illegal
search.2"' The government argued that the affidavit supporting the war-
rant was sufficient to support a probable cause finding, based both on the
accomplice's statements that he had seen child pornography images on
the defendant's computer, and that the defendant told the accomplice he
downloaded those pictures onto his computer.142 The United States Dis-
trict Court for the District of Oklahoma agreed, denying the defendant's
motion to exclude that evidence.243
ii. Decision
The Tenth Circuit determined that "the evidence presented to the
magistrate judge ... established a fair probability that a search of [the
defendant's] computer would reveal contraband within the meaning of
18 U.S.C. §§2252, 2256, such that the magistrate had a 'substantial ba-
sis' to determine that probable cause existed to issue the second search
warrant.",2" Namely, the three items of possible child pornography that
the agents observed in the defendant's home, plus the accomplice's
statement that he had seen an image of a nude child on the defendant's
computer monitor, and that the defendant told the accomplice he had
more pictures on his computer, together established "a 'fair probability'
that evidence of possession of child pornography would be found on the
hard drive of [the defendant's] personal computer" or disks. 245
,Obtaining a second search warrant is required; in United States v.
Carey,246 below, the Tenth Circuit suppressed child pornography images
seized collateral to an original search warrant where, unlike here,
authorities did not seek a second search warrant.2 47
b. United States v. Carey
248
i. Facts
During his arrest, the defendant, a cocaine dealer, consented to a
search of his apartment. 249 The defendant also consented in writing to the
removal of any property under his control, "if said property shall be es-
sential in the proof of the commission of any crime in violation of the
Laws of the United States., 250 As a result of that search, the police seized
two computers under the belief that the computers "would either be sub-
241. See Wolfe, 2000 WL 1862667, at *2.
242. See id. at * 1 -*2.
243. See id. at *2.
244. Id. at *3.
245. Id. at *4.
246. 172 F.3d 1268 (10th Cir. 1999).
247. See Carey, 172 F.3d at 1271, 1276.
248. 172 F.3d 1268 (10th Cir. 1999).
249. See id. at 1270.
250. Id.
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ject to forfeiture or [provide] evidence of [the defendant's] drug deal-
ing., '
The police obtained a warrant to search "the [two] computers for
'names, telephone numbers, ledger receipts, addresses, and other docu-
mentary evidence pertaining to the sale and distribution of controlled
substances.' ' '2 2 In the course of that warrant's execution, the police dis-
covered a large number of "files with sexually suggestive titles and the
label 'PG.'''5' The police copied those files to a floppy disk and opened
them on another computer.5 The police discovered numerous images
containing child pornography.255
The defendant "was charged with ... possessing a computer hard
drive that contained three or more images of child pornography produced
with materials shipped in interstate commerce." '256 The defendant moved
to suppress the seized evidence, arguing that the police seized the hard
drive as a result of an illegal "general, warrantless search,, 257 and that
"files not pertaining to the sale or distribution of controlled substances
were opened and searched, and [therefore] ... should have been sup-
pressed."' 58 The United States District Court for the District of Kansas
259denied that motion to suppress.
ii. Decision
On appeal, the defendant argued that despite the clear specificity of
the warrant, the detective searched files that were outside the scope of
the search warrant.26° The government counter-argued that the plain view
doctrine permitted the file discovery.26' Under the plain view doctrine,
[a] police officer may properly seize evidence of a crime without a
warrant if:
(1) the officer was lawfully in a position from which to view the ob-
ject seized in plain view; (2) the object's incriminating character was
immediately apparent -- i.e., the officer had probable cause to believe
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Id. "JPG" is a code appended to a file's name (a "filename extension"), which designates
that the file has been compressed by a method developed by the Joint Photographic Experts Group.
See Joint Photographic Experts Group, at http://wombat.doc.ic.ac.uk/foldoc/
foldoc.cgi?Joint+Photographic+Experts+Group (Sept. 11, 2000). JPG is one of a number of
compression schemes used to reduce the size of digital images for easy electronic transmission. Id.
254. See Carey, 172 F.3d at 1271.
255. See id.
256. Id. at 1270 (noting that prosecutors charged the defendant with violation of 18 U.S.C. §
2252A(a)(5)(B)).
257. Id.
258. Id. at 1272.
259. See id. at 1271.
260. See Carey, 172 F.3d at 1272.
261. See id.
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the object was contraband or evidence of a crime; and (3) the officer
had a lawful right of access to the object itself.2
6
2
The Tenth Circuit did not agree that the plain view doctrine applied, rea-
soning that while the detective did not expect to find child pornography
upon opening the first image file, after that point he had probable cause
to suspect that the rest of the image files contained child pornography.263
However, the detective improperly, and illegally, continued his search.26
"When he opened the subsequent files, he knew he was not going to find
items related to drug activity as specified in the warrant." 265 He knew he
would find additional pornographic images.2' Therefore, the files were
not "inadvertently discovered"; they were illegally seized.267 Following
reasoning set out by the United States Supreme Court in Coolidge v. New
Hampshire, where the Supreme Court determined that "the 'plain view'
doctrine may not be used to extend a general exploratory search from one
object to another until something incriminating at last emerges, 2 68 the
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit suppressed those files, stating that
"closed files ... [are] not in plain view. 269
The Tenth Circuit disagreed with the government's argument that
the defendant's consent to search his apartment implicitly included his
computer files' contents.27 Because the police had the computers in their
custody, their search needed to proceed more cautiously. 7 ' The Tenth
Circuit concluded that the police "exceeded the scope of the warrant"
and should have used a more narrowly tailored method to search the
drive.7 The court suggested several less intrusive methods, including
"observing files types and titles listed on the directory, doing a key word
search for relevant terms, or reading portions of each file stored in the
memory., 273 Although the court based its decision only on the facts at
issue, it implied that when the police remove a computer from a defen-
dant's home pursuant to a valid search warrant, the subsequent search of
that computer must not expand into a general search.274
A situation where the computer remains in the defendant's control is
distinguishable from this case, where authorities removed the computer
because "no 'exigent circumstance or practical reason [permitted] offi-
262. Id. (citing United States v. Soussi. 29 F.3d 565, 570 (10th Cir. 1994)).
263. See id. at 1273.
264. See id.
265. Id. at 1274.
266. See Carey, 172 F.3d at 1274.
267. Id. at 1273.
268. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 466 (1971).
269. Carey, 172 F.3d at 1272-73.
270. See id. at 1274.
271. See id. at 1276.
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. See id. at 1273.
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cers to rummage through all of the stored data regardless of its relevance
or its relation to the information specified in the warrant. '' 275 The Court
of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit suggested that had the computers re-
mained in the defendant's apartment, the detectives permissibly could
have searched each file or proceeded in a less circumspect manner.276
Courts likely would distinguish this situation from the situation where
277detectives search for child pornography under a warrant. In that case,
the detectives could search each file. 78 The United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Virginia, below, failed to base its decision on a
warrant's scope; when searching for specific information, irrespective of
the underlying crime, the search of a computer may include all of its
files.279
2. Other Jurisdictions
a. United States v. Grays°
i. Facts
Pursuant to a warrant, FBI agents conducted a search at the defen-
dant's home for information relating to computer intrusions at the Na-
tional Library of Medicine.28 ' The agents seized four computers and cop-
ied their hard drives onto CD-ROMs.282 Following the FBI's Computer
Analysis and Response Team practices, an agent opened and briefly re-
viewed each file in the directories and subdirectories, both to aid in the
discovery of warrant-specified material and to determine how many files
would fit on each CD-ROM. 2' The agent opened approximately eighty
percent of the files on each hard drive.2
During that process, the agent discovered a folder entitled "Tiny
Teen.,, 285 He opened the folder "because it was the next [one] listed and
he was opening all of the [folders] as part of his routine search for the
items listed in the warrant., 286 While the agent knew that the files he was
searching for were likely text files, he opened "picture files because
computer files can be misleadingly labeled, particularly if the owner of
275. Carey, 172 F.3d at 1275-76 (quoting Raphael Winick, Searches and Seizures of
Computers and Computer Data, 8 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 75, 107 (1994)).
276. See id.
277. See supra text accompanying note 184.
278. See supra text accompanying notes 183-84.
279. See United States v. Gray, 78 F. Supp. 2d 524, 528-29 (E.D. Va. 1999).
280. 78 F. Supp. 2d 524.
281. See Gray, 78 F. Supp. 2d at 526.
282. See id.
283. See id. The Computer Analysis and Response Team is an FBI unit specializing in the
forensic examination of computers. See FBI Laboratory: Computer Analysis and Response Team, at
http://www.fbi.gov/hq/lab/org/cart.htm (last visited Feb. 18. 2002).
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those files is trying to conceal illegal materials. 287 The agent discovered
pornographic pictures, some of which he thought contained images of
minors. 8 The agent obtained a second search warrant that authorized a
search of the defendant's computer files for evidence of child pornogra-
phy.289 The defendant sought to suppress all the images discovered on the
computer, contending that the search of the folders "was beyond the
scope of the [original search] warrant. ' 290
ii. Decision
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia
disagreed.29' While holding that a search warrant must be particular to be
executable, the court noted that
[i]n some searches, however, it is not immediately apparent whether
or not an object is within the scope of a search warrant; in such cases,
an officer must examine the object simply to determine whether or
not it is one that he is authorized to seize .... As a result, in any
search for records or documents, "innocuous records must be exam-
ined to determine whether they fall into the category of those papers
covered by the search warrant.
2 19 2
The court held that an agent, acting under the authorization of a search
warrant "to search a home or office for documents containing certain
specific information [is] entitled to examine all files located at the site to
look for the specified information. 293 Thus, the district court determined
that the law permitted the agents to look at each file.294 In addition, the
court held that if, in the course of that search,
an agent sees, in plain view, evidence of criminal activity other than
that for which she is searching, this does not constitute an unreason-
able search under the Fourth Amendment, for "[v]iewing an article
that is already in plain view does not involve an invasion of
privacy. 295
The court thus permitted seizure of those pornographic pictures under the
"plain view" exception and held that the investigator's search and seizure
of the images contained in the "Tiny Teen" folder "was not beyond the
scope of the search warrant."2"
287. Id. at 527 n.5. See also supra note 153.
288. See Gray, 78 F. Supp. 2d at 527.
289. See id. at 527-28.
290. Id. at 528.
291. Seeid. at 531.
292. id. at 528 (quoting United States v. Kufrovich, 997 F. Supp. 246, 264 (D. Conn. 1997)).
293. Id. at 528.
294. See Gray, 78 F. Supp. 2d at 531.
295. Id. at 528 (quoting United States v. Jackson, 131 F.3d 1105, 1108 (4th Cir. 1997)).
296. Id. at 528-29.
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3. Analysis
In the conclusion of Carey, the Tenth Circuit stated:
[The detective's] seizure of the evidence upon which the charge of
conviction was based was a consequence of an unconstitutional gen-
eral search, and the district court erred by refusing to suppress it.
Having reached that conclusion, however, we are quick to note these
results are predicated only upon the particular facts of this case, and a
search of computer files based on different facts might produce a dif-
ferent result.
297
Foreshadowing the situation in United States v. Campos,298 Justice
Baldock's concurrence stated, "if the record showed that [the agent] had
merely continued his search for drug-related evidence and, in doing so,
continued to come across evidence of child pornography, I think a differ-
ent result would be required."299 The distinction here is that had the agent
continued to find evidence of child pornography collaterally, while re-
maining within the scope of his original search warrant, that collateral
discovery of pornography would have been admissible.?° Where, as here,
the detective exceeded the scope of the search warrant, the court found
the evidence inadmissible.0
When authorities conduct a warranted search in a child pornography
case, authorities must open and examine each file, to counter the "hid-
ing" issues.3 2 That search may turn up additional evidence of child por-
nography that the Court would find permissible. 33 The Court places a
restriction upon this search when authorities find the pornographic mate-. • • 304
rial collateral to an investigation. In that case, the investigator must
stop and obtain a search warrant before proceeding. 305 The United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, however, sees this






During this past year, the Tenth Circuit made several changes in
how it interprets and applies the law concerning child pornography. The
297. United States v. Carey, 172 F.3d 1268, 1276 (10th Cir. 1999).
298. 221 F.3d 1143 (10th Cir. 2000).
299. Carey, 172 F.3d at 1277 (Baldock, J., concurring). Cf discussion supra Parts II.B.2. and
II.B.3.
300. See Carey, 172 F.3d at 1276-77 (Baldock, J., concurring). Cf discussion supra Parts
I.B.2. and II.B.3.
301. See Carey, 172 F.3d at 1276.
302. See KERR, supra note 81, at 29.
303. See United States v. Gray, 78 F. Supp. 2d 524, 527 n.5, 531 (E.D. Va. 1999).
304. See Carey, 172 F.3d at 1277 (Baldock, J., concurring).
305. See id.
306. See Gray, 78 F. Supp. 2d at 530-3 1.
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Court made these changes in response to concerns Congress expressed
when enacting the Sex Crimes Against Children Prevention Act.3 7 The
essence of Congress' worry was that the nexus of child pornography and
computers may produce particularly harmful effects. Not only might
children be enticed to engage in pornographic activity by merely viewing
pornographic images but, due to the ease with which a computer allows
people to copy and disseminate images over a virtually limitless market,
a computer's use may increase the overall number of images dissemi-
nated.O In response to Congress' concerns, the Tenth Circuit expanded
its interpretation of solicitation of a minor by computer, supported sen-
tence-level enhancements for child pornography defendants who used
computers to commit their crimes, expanded traditional search and sei-
zure standards by employing a fair probability standard to determine the
appropriateness of complete search of a computer, and supported Inter-
net-use restrictions on paroled child pornographers.
While Congress' concerns are legitimate, the changes wrought by
the Court of Appeals' new interpretations are worrisome. Although we
no longer live in a society where "an eye for an eye" is our basis for de-
termining punishment, we must strike a proper balance between actual
harm and its subsequent punishment. Perceived harm alone should not
form that basis. However, according to the Sentencing Commission, such
perceived harm may do just that.3°9 "[T]he federal cases sentenced to date
typically do not involve the type of computer use that would result in
either wide dissemination or a likelihood that the material will be viewed
by children."3 ' The Sentencing Commission made that statement in early
1996, when the Sentencing Commission examined each of the 423 cases
involving sex offenses against minors that came before the federal courts
during 1994 and 1995."' These cases were likely the same cases Con-
gress had in mind when stating its reasoning for enacting the Sex Crimes
Against Children Prevention Act. Congress' fears thus may be un-
founded, or at minimum, unrepresentative of the entire body of child
pornography defendants using computers.
The changes brought about by the Sex Crimes Against Children
Prevention Act have materially affected defendants' rights and sentenc-
ing. At least two circuit courts, the Tenth Circuit and the Sixth Circuit,
have relied upon Congress' concerns when interpreting child pornogra-
phy laws. If Congress' underlying fears are either unfounded or unrepre-
sentative of the whole, then the Sixth and Tenth circuits have expanded
laws and limited rights based upon faulty or misguided policy. Applying
307. Pub. L. No. 104-71, 109 Stat. 774 (1995) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2423; 28
U.S.C. § 994).
308. See H.R. REP. No. 104-90, at 3-4 (1995), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 759, 760-61.




COMBATING THE ILLICIT INTERNET
such inroads to all child pornographers using computers may therefore be
excessive, overreaching, and out of balance with the harm caused by
such computer use.
When the actual effect of that law abridges fundamental rights, as
here, Congress should reassess the law. While Congress has powerful
reasons to diminish a sex offender's rights, fear of the possible should
not become the basis for decision-making. Congress should reassess its
reasoning behind the passage of the Sex Crimes Against Children Pre-
vention Act, in light of the act's effect upon current case law. If Congress
finds its concerns currently founded, the changes should remain. Other-
wise, Congress and the courts should limit the application of the Sex
Crimes Against Children Prevention Act to situations where a defendant
actually used a computer to entice minors to engage in pornographic
activity or to disseminate images containing child pornography.
Anton L. Janik, Jr.*
* J.D. Candidate 2003, University of Denver College of Law.
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